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Abstract
Both a flagship policy and a costly and wasteful liability – since its inception in the 1960s, the 
common agricultural policy (CAP) of the European Community (EC) has been controversial. 
This article investigates why the CAP survived largely unchanged through the 1970s, a decade 
of economic and political crisis and transformation, and maintained its centrality in the 
Community. The article focuses first on the entrenched institutional interests in the Council of 
Ministers and the Commission before analyzing two key events that could have led to a shift of 
interests in the EC and a reform of the policy: the accession of the United Kingdom to the EC in 
1973 and the Tokyo Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (1973-9). 
The decision of the Community to protect the CAP against these challenges is revealing with 
regard to the state and outlook of the Community in the 1970s. The article argues that in a 
period of uncertainty and transformation, the CAP maintained a reluctant centrality in the EC, 
underscoring European unity and commitment to European integration. Internal challenges such 
as enlargement with the UK and external ones such as the GATT trade negotiations were thus 
met with the determination to keep the CAP intact. 
Keywords: European integration, common agricultural policy, GATT, United 
States, enlargement
Introduction
The common agricultural policy (CAP) was a creation of the 1960s, of the optimistic 
beginnings of the European Economic Community (EEC) when substantial common 
policies - supranational policies - were seen as the future. Already by the 1970s the 
CAP came to represent wastefulness and protectionism. Yet, the policy only underwent 
major reform from the mid-1980s onwards. Piers Ludlow argues that by the mid-1980s 
the CAP had lost its centrality to European integration compared to the 1960s and that 
this paved the way to reform.1 However, his study, like most other historical studies on 
the CAP, does not analyze the policy, its centrality and staying power in the 1970s, a 
period of economic recession and political uncertainty.  
This article examines some of the factors that led the Community to preserve the 
CAP almost unchanged in the 1970s. The main focus will be on the analysis of two 
potential ‘shocks’ that could have led to a reform of the policy: the accession of the 
United Kingdom to the European Community (EC) in 1973 and the Tokyo Round 
negotiations in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (1973-9) where 
the CAP came under sustained attack from the Community’s trading partners, most 
importantly the United States. The decision of the Community to protect the CAP 
against these shocks, even though support for the policy was also contested within the 
EC itself, can reveal much about the state and outlook of the Community in the 1970s. 
Regarding the accession of the United Kingdom, maintaining a policy that did not 
benefit this new member state, and which it sought to change, became symptomatic of 
the uneasy relationship Britain has since had with the Community. 
In the 1970s, a period of uncertainty and transformation, the CAP became a 
symbol of unity, solidarity and commitment to European integration. The policy became 
a useful political and negotiation tool, both within the Community and vis-à-vis third 
countries, particularly the United States. An archives-based historical analysis of the 
CAP for the 1970s is lacking. This research is based on Community and member states’ 
archives, private papers and oral history interviews. It aims to contribute to the history 
of European integration and transatlantic relations in the 1970s more broadly. 
To understand the puzzle of non-reform of the CAP, it is necessary to briefly 
outline the main problems the policy faced in the 1970s. The CAP established an 
internal market for agricultural products within the EEC. Its two main instruments were 
price policy and a variable import levy; agricultural prices were seen as directly linked 
to farmers’ incomes. Prices for the main agricultural products were negotiated each year 
in the Council of (Agricultural) Ministers who were not shy to increase prices to serve 
farming communities at home. Ann-Christina Knudsen characterized the CAP as a 
welfare policy for farmers.2 Problems began to appear in the late 1960s when high farm 
prices as well as technological innovation resulted in increasing agricultural production. 
In the course of the 1970s the increase in production resulted in surpluses, epitomized in 
the butter ‘mountains’ and wine ‘lakes’. Surplus production was bought up and stored, 
the costs funded by the Community. As there was no cap on CAP spending, over eighty, 
and at times ninety, percent of the Community budget were spent on the policy.3 The 
second instrument, the variable import levies, was intended to raise the price of imports 
from third countries to the (usually higher) price level within the Community, while 
export restitutions allowed the export of Community produce onto the world market, 
where prices were usually lower, without Community farmers incurring a loss. The 
system worked well as long as the Community was importing more food than it was 
exporting, though this was changing in the 1970s. The Community became self-
sufficient in many agricultural products and began to compete with other more efficient 
exporters of agricultural products on the world market.4 Analyzing the welfare costs and 
trade distorting effects of the CAP and other agricultural policies, Giovanni Federico 
called the CAP ‘the worst agricultural policy of the 20th century’.5 
Historical and political science literature on the CAP is usually situated at two 
ends of the spectrum of the policy’s history: the first set of literature, mainly historical 
analyses, seeks to explain the CAP’s construction in the 1960s6 and the second set, 
mainly consisting of political science or agricultural economists’ analyses, studies its 
first reforms, in particular the MacSharry reform of 1992.7 In political science, historical 
institutionalism has been used to explain policy inertia. According to this theory, 
original designs of a policy get ‘locked-in’ and become ‘path dependent’ and are 
subsequently difficult to change until an ‘external shock’ occurs which allows for a 
radical shift in a policy.8 The 1970s to mid-1980s are then often merely referred to as 
the period the original design was ‘locked in’ and became ‘path dependent’, where 
problems were not sufficiently serious to warrant radical reform.9 One important 
element regarding the persistence of the CAP is the fact that the policy was managed by 
an ‘epistemic Community’ including the Commission’s directorate-general (DG VI), a 
plethora of management committees, most importantly the Special Committee on 
Agriculture and, at the top, the Council of Ministers for Agriculture, all of whom were 
wedded to the status quo. In this narrative, agricultural ministers were also under the 
spell of powerful farmers’ lobbies at home, and their willingness to voice their 
discontent either at the ballot box (the ‘farm vote’) or through very public 
demonstrations in Brussels and member states’ capitals.10 It is this convergence of 
interests that held the CAP in place over a long period of time. The CAP’s reforms in 
the 1980s and early 1990s were then triggered by internal (budgetary crisis) and 
external (GATT Trade negotiations in the Uruguay Round, 1986-94) events or ‘shocks’, 
which led to a reform of the CAP.11 However, arguably the accession of the United 
Kingdom and the GATT Tokyo Round can also be defined as ‘shocks’ that seriously 
challenged the CAP, but did not result in reform. Neither issue has been assessed in 
terms of its impact, or lack of, on the CAP.
Historical studies on the CAP in the 1970s are few and far between, even though 
this was the decade where the policy’s problems came to the fore and it was seriously 
challenged for the first time – internally and externally.12 It is therefore of interest to 
study the motives of Community institutions and member states to actively protect the 
CAP or at least tolerate it being ring-fenced. The article uses the example of the CAP to 
highlight intra-Community conflicts and interests as well as external dynamics such as 
those generated by enlargement and by the global trading system as expressed in the 
GATT negotiations between 1973 and 1979 that had an impact on the CAP and the 
Community as a whole.
The first part of the article outlines the centrality of the CAP in the 1970s, 
focusing on institutional structures and preferences, which have contributed to the ‘path 
dependence’ of the CAP. The article then studies the two events that could have led to 
CAP reform in the 1970s by shifting the balance and interests in the Community 
regarding the CAP. The first of these is the enlargement of the Community with the 
United Kingdom, a country that had a small and efficient farm sector and was not set to 
benefit much from the CAP.13 It can thus be assumed that the UK had a strong interest 
in reforming the CAP. During the 1970s the CAP became an obstacle in the external 
relations of the Community. The fact that the Community became a major exporter of 
agricultural products in the 1970s (while also remaining the largest importer of farm 
products) was criticized in both developing and developed countries. Why this 
international pressure, in particular by the United States, was not sufficient to achieve 
change will be studied in the third part, using the example of the GATT Tokyo Round. 
The Centrality of the CAP in the 1970s 
Ludlow argues that by 1985 the CAP was no longer the ‘green heart’ of the 
Community.14 The CAP may indeed have gradually lost importance among Community 
policies since it was created in the mid-1960s, but during the 1970s it was still a central 
policy for the EC. For the Community, the 1970s began with optimism. In December 
1969, at the summit of The Hague, European heads of state and government had agreed 
the ‘deepening, widening and completion’ of the Community. This resulted in 
agreement to embark on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), led to a settlement on 
the financing of the Community in 1970 (and crucially the CAP as the biggest item on 
the budget) as well as the opening of accession negotiations with the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, Ireland and Norway. However, optimism soon gave way to perceptions of 
crisis. Historians now interpret the 1970s and early 1980s as a period of transition and 
transformation.15 New uncertainties emerged, starting with the announcement of the 
U.S. government, in August 1971, to suspend the convertibility of the U.S. Dollar into 
gold and thus end the post-war Bretton Woods system of stable exchange rates. The 
resulting currency fluctuations, combined with the slowing down of post-war economic 
growth, heralded a period of sustained inflation, high unemployment and the failure of 
Keynesian economic policies. These events gave rise to the perception of a deep crisis 
enveloping Western democracies. European integration and its future were now also in 
doubt. Progress on EMU and other Community projects such as common energy or 
regional policies failed to materialize as member states resorted to unilateral measures 
to cope with monetary and economic uncertainties. Transatlantic relations were also 
affected. The United States, until then favorable and protective of European integration, 
were beginning to see the Community as an economic and political rival.16 
The CAP as a central and fully developed common policy therefore appeared as 
important as ever, if not more so. The European Commission and the Council of 
Agricultural Ministers became the guardians of the CAP, wedded to its three pillars of 
market unity, Community preference and financial solidarity. The Commission had 
played a central role in designing the CAP during the 1960s and it had an important 
stake in preserving it.17 In a period where the Community was not yet the developed and 
stable institution it has become since the 1990s, questioning the CAP would have meant 
questioning the Community, and thus the Commission’s, very raison d’être. This 
certainly rings true with regard to how the French government viewed the Commission 
during the Gaullist challenge of the empty chair crisis in 1965/6 and its aftermath. Were 
it not for the CAP, in which French policy makers and farmers had an important stake, 
their interest in upholding the Community and with it the Commission would have been 
even less enthusiastic.18 This first Community crisis had also demonstrated to the 
Commission that it was unwise to utilize the CAP as a bargaining tool as it had done in 
1965 to obtain further concessions from the Council of Ministers.19 In addition to this 
clear interest in its own survival and in maintaining its own relevance and importance, 
the Commission’s own institutional developments favored the CAP’s status quo. 
Undoubtedly, the Commission identified agriculture as a sector in which it could 
demonstrate its expertise and effectiveness.20 Its directorate-general for agriculture (DG 
VI) had grown to become one of the largest and most powerful organizations within the 
Commission.21 The development and particular outlook of DG VI, as well as the 
mechanisms of agricultural decision-making in the Commission and the Community 
more generally, were conducive to preserving the status quo of the CAP. At least during 
the 1970s and early 1980s there was no serious reform discourse in DG VI. British 
official Michael Franklin observed that when he was at the Commission in the mid-
1970s ‘reform was a dirty word’.22 Most of the commissioners in charge of agriculture 
had been ministers of agriculture in their home countries before joining the 
Commission. Pierre Lardinois, commissioner for agriculture from 1973 to 1977 is a 
case in point. As a former Dutch minister of agriculture, when becoming commissioner 
he was respected by the other ministers as one of their peers. Given that Lardinois had 
been socialized into the way of negotiating in the Council, he understood the constraints 
and pressures his peers were under. It was unlikely that he would pursue a reform 
agenda.23 
The close relationship between DG VI and agricultural lobbies has to be an 
important element for understanding the organization’s attitude towards CAP reform, 
but it cannot be discussed here in any detail.24 Given the support the CAP enjoyed in the 
Commission, it would be too simplistic to oppose DG VI and its pro-farm stance to the 
rest of the Commission in favor of reform. Even though there were misgivings about the 
centrality of the CAP among staff of other directorates-generals and commissioners, 
most shared the belief that European integration was most tangible and concrete in the 
CAP. The Commission generally shared the aim of preserving the CAP also for cultural 
and social reasons, as it allowed support for farming families in line with culturally 
embedded ideas of farming as a way of life and as benefitting society more generally.25 
Still in the mid-1980s, the president of the Commission, Jacques Delors, held on to the 
idea that farmers were strong supporters of European integration because of the CAP. 
For him this was a strong argument for upholding the policy and distributing funds to 
farmers.26 
The college of commissioners had regular and often controversial discussions 
about the CAP. Even if there was criticism of the CAP by individual Commission 
members, the Commission was never able to agree on a coherent reform program for 
the CAP that went beyond doctoring the symptoms of the policy. At occasions such as 
the drafting of studies or reform memoranda such as ‘Stocktaking of the CAP’ (1975), 
some Commissioners took this opportunity to enter into serious discussions on the 
future of the policy.27 However, for others, these memoranda should merely justify the 
policy and its role in the European integration process. According to a document from 
the cabinet of Commission president François-Xavier Ortoli (1973-6), the purpose of 
the Stocktaking memorandum should be to justify the core principles and instruments of 
the CAP. The CAP had to remain what French minister of agriculture, Jacques Chirac, 
called the ‘donjon’, that is the ‘keep’ of the castle of Europe – ‘a policy … that 
indirectly obliges the member states not to delay seeking community solutions in other 
sectors such as currency, food aid, the environment…’28 
This quote underscores how in the 1970s the CAP was still seen as an engine of 
European integration that would lead to further integration in other sectors, still 
suggesting a belief in the neofunctionalist ‘spill-over’ theory.29 Not surprisingly, in the 
Stocktaking memorandum, the Commission first and foremost insisted on the ‘central 
position the common agricultural policy occupies in the process of European 
integration’.30 The Council of Ministers, lacking any appetite for CAP reform, was 
content to accept the memorandum with its limited suggestions for altering or 
‘improving’ the policy.31 
In the 1970s, the future role of the Commission in the Community appeared to 
be uncertain. New leaders such as German chancellor Helmut Schmidt and French 
president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing resented the supranational element of the 
Community and preferred to deal with other national leaders directly, in what eventually 
became the European Council.32 According to Henri Froment-Meurice, a French 
diplomat, ‘in 1974-1975, [Giscard] was inclined to swallow up the Commission’ and 
turn it into an administration merely executing the decisions of the Council of 
Ministers.33 Given that the CAP was one of the few policies the French approved of, 
CAP reform would have been a foolish thing for the Commission to undertake. 
This also explains why, in 1977, the new president of the Commission, Roy 
Jenkins (1977-81), did not identify CAP reform as a major project for his presidency but 
chose monetary union instead.34 His cabinet member in charge of agriculture left him in 
no doubt that CAP reform was a hot potato: ‘In order to avoid wrong-footing oneself 
from the start it is prudent to talk in terms of “improvement” development” “adaptation” 
or “dynamic change” of the CAP.’35 As a British national, Jenkins must have realized 
that CAP reform was not something that would gain him friends and allies among the 
(continental) member states. However, small steps were made in the Jenkins period with 
the Commission pursuing a more rigorous price policy.36 Agricultural commissioner 
Finn Olaf Gundelach, incidentally not a former minister of agriculture, and DG VI were 
ready to change and fine-tune the policy, but recoiled from proposing large-scale 
reform.37 Obtaining support within the Commission, in particular from French, Dutch 
and Irish commissioners, let alone the Council of Ministers, would also have been more 
than uncertain. 
The idea of CAP reform only gained ground – albeit very slowly - with the 
involvement of a new actor in Community policy-making, the European Council, and 
the deep budget crisis triggered by rocketing CAP spending in the early 1980s.38 
Arguably the heads of state and government’s broader view allowed overcoming, or at 
least counterbalancing, the agricultural ministers’ decision-making guided by sectoral 
interests. Even then, the process of policy-change was slow and fiercely resisted by 
some member states, particularly France and Germany. A first mini-reform, the 
introductions of milk quotas in 1984, only came after lengthy discussions and after high 
compensations were decided to cushion income losses of farmers.39 
The United Kingdom and the CAP
One event that could have shaken up the CAP consensus in the Community and led to a 
reform of the policy was the accession of the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland to 
the EC in 1973. While Denmark and Ireland would become net beneficiaries of the 
policy, Britain has had a difficult relationship with the CAP going back to the country’s 
first attempt to join the Community in the early 1960s. For the UK the CAP was 
problematic for four reasons: firstly, because of the CAP’s likely effect on Britain’s 
traditional Commonwealth trading preferences; secondly, because the UK would have 
to change its entire support system for the agricultural sector from direct income support 
to the CAP’s price policy; thirdly, because the CAP, due to higher commodity prices, 
would result in an increase in food prices for British consumers and, last but not least, 
because the UK’s status as an importer of food would mean that Britain would become 
a net contributor to the EEC budget. Whilst in the first round of accession negotiations 
in 1961-3 agriculture became indeed the most difficult item, by then the British 
government had actually accepted the first two consequences of membership for 
domestic aims: CAP protection would allow the UK to develop its own agricultural 
sector rather than continue to be the ‘dumping ground’ for Commonwealth agricultural 
surpluses - though it was not acceptable to say this publicly and the UK continued to 
play the Commonwealth card in the accession negotiation and the renegotiations in 
1974-5. It was also found that most UK farmers would not be worse off under the CAP 
than under the deficiency payments system (direct income aids), which had become 
very expensive to run.40 It was the likely increase in food prices for consumers that most 
worried the Conservative government under prime minister Harold Macmillan and 
subsequent governments. The accession negotiations were ended unilaterally by French 
president Charles de Gaulle in January 1963, partly because he feared British 
membership would alter the CAP which was then still in the process of being fleshed 
out.41 
In 1970 the Tory government under prime minister Edward Heath, a pro-
European who had led the first round of entry negotiations in the 1960s, revived the 
British application to join the Community. With regard to agriculture the passage of 
time had seen a change in priorities: by the early 1970s the issue of the Commonwealth 
seemed even less important to the British public. Moreover, the British themselves 
started to question the sense of fighting for Commonwealth access for agricultural 
products given that their own production was on the rise, thus increasing the costs of 
their domestic agricultural policy. Only New Zealand dairy and Commonwealth sugar 
imports were still seen as high priority issues.42 When Britain joined the EC in 1973, the 
CAP did not seem such a harmful thing at first. Moreover, by then the British 
government believed that it was better to accept the CAP and be ‘in’ and to change 
things from within. The CAP was indeed one of the policies it very much wanted to 
adapt when a member.43 Why did the strategy of changing things once ‘we are in’ not 
work out? As this section will show, firstly, the UK government underestimated the 
centrality of the CAP for the Community. Secondly, the British government and in 
particular its agricultural minister, were not effective in forging coalitions in Brussels to 
obtain change, but preferred to cater to a domestic audience to which they complained 
about the unreasonableness of the CAP. Thirdly, both the UK government and the 
Community tended to treat issues that were causing problems to the British and were 
linked to the CAP, for instance the British contribution to the EC budget, as specifically 
British problems, for which a UK-specific solution needed to be found, thus avoiding a 
general reform of the policy. 
Immediately after joining, British civil servants and politicians were in for a 
reality check; the ‘way of doing things’ in Brussels clashed with British ideas how 
things ought to be done. The readiness of the Council of Ministers to accept and push 
for increases in farm prices was criticized, as well as the amount of time agriculture 
took up in the Commission’s meetings.44 This would have to change, Britain’s 
commissioner in Brussels, Sir Christopher Soames, told prime minister Heath.45 On the 
other hand, Heath’s Cabinet secretary and head of the European Unit in the Cabinet 
office, Sir John Hunt, suggested to Heath to adopt a more conciliatory and subtle 
strategy: ‘We shall need to work very hard to obtain support for our views and, above 
all, to avoid being in a minority of one.’ He mentioned the CAP and in particular 
keeping agricultural prices down as one field of action.46 This was good advice that, it 
must be said, was later rarely heeded. 
Once the UK was a member, a gradual CAP reform was indeed envisaged by 
UK government departments.47 The French government had anticipated this and 
continued to call on the British to leave the CAP alone. In a summit meeting between 
Heath and French president Georges Pompidou, Pompidou insisted that Heath accept 
the CAP and support it. When Heath mentioned concerns from British consumers about 
rising butter prices, Pompidou retorted with the importance of preserving the 
countryside and its way of life. Small farming was important and, he added, ‘his 
concept of the CAP formed part of the French philosophy’.48 Struggling to master each 
other’s languages, they also spoke a different language regarding agricultural policy. 
Heath was moreover surprised that the Germans, in particular the governing Social 
Democrats, took a similar view to the French and he mentioned this in his meeting with 
French agricultural minister, Chirac, who had also come to remind the prime minister of 
the inviolability of the CAP.49 Clearly, the British had underestimated the vested 
interests in the policy on the continent and within the Community institutions. Foreign 
office and Cabinet office documents suggest that the British ministers and civil servants 
were puzzled over the attachment to the policy, in particular in Germany. The Foreign 
Office was set on the case to solve this mystery, thereby discovering the German 
government’s inconsistent attitude towards the CAP, which would mean that they ‘are 
not reliable allies’ for pushing CAP reform.50 The strategy of ‘join now and negotiate 
later’ certainly did not work out as planned during Britain’s first year of membership. 
For the time being, the British had no choice but to accept the CAP as ‘a fact of life’.51 
While the Heath government seemed to have resigned itself to the CAP, the policy 
appeared to come under more serious threat when a Labour government under prime 
minister Harold Wilson took over following the election in February 1974. To 
overcome the split between pro- and anti-marketeers in the party, Labour had pledged to 
demand a substantial re-negotiation of the terms of British membership, including 
‘major changes in the Common Agricultural Policy’ and ‘new and fairer methods of 
financing the European Community budget’.52 The crux was in the demand of ‘major 
changes’ and how flexible the British government and the Community would be about 
the issue. In fact, Wilson and his foreign secretary, James Callaghan, were quite flexible 
and merely wanted concessions from the Community that could be presented to 
Parliament and the British public as a ‘success’ in order to justify campaigning for 
remaining in the EC.53 This means that it was possible for the other member states to 
obviate the potentially dangerous call for a ‘major’ CAP reform and seek a UK-specific 
solution instead. 
However, the issue nevertheless caused a brief bout of activity in the 
Community as CAP critics used the UK government’s renegotiation demand to raise the 
issue of CAP reform. Discussing the British demands at an informal dinner in Paris in 
September 1974 with the other EC heads of state and government, German chancellor 
Schmidt proposed a fundamental review of the CAP.54 Schmidt was anything but an 
ardent supporter of the policy or of supranational integration more generally. The 
British government thus potentially had an ally in their demands for change in the CAP. 
However, as discussed above, like all German governments, Schmidt and his coalition 
government also succumbed to the typical German ambiguity regarding the CAP: a 
general dislike for and open criticism of the policy went hand in hand with a support of 
the status quo.55 Community bargaining as it had developed over the past fifteen years 
also meant that the policy could be used as a useful bargaining tool to gain concessions 
from the French.56 Schmidt’s call for CAP reform at the Paris meeting can thus only be 
seen as rhetorical tool to show understanding for the British position and perhaps as an 
expression of the chancellor’s personal frustration with the CAP.57 Schmidt’s demand 
resulted in the Commission undertaking the ‘Stocktaking exercise’, already mentioned 
above, resulting in a lengthy, albeit toothless, report on the CAP that was published in 
1975. A half-hearted demand for radical change was thus delayed and channeled into a 
report that did not lead to much, let alone ‘major change’, in the policy as the political 
appetite for such a move was lacking and the British problem had by then been settled, 
at least in the short term.58 Another mitigating factor that made the CAP appear as a 
lesser evil in the period 1974-5 was the world food crisis. A period of general food 
shortages, particularly of grains, had resulted in high world commodity prices. In 
contrast to the volatile situation on the world market, the CAP ensured comparably low 
commodity prices and reliable supply for consumers in the sheltered EC market. The 
world food crisis is discussed in more detail in the final part of the article, but it 
certainly also played a role in limiting the ambitions of the Wilson government 
regarding CAP reform, given that at this crucial point in time the CAP momentarily did 
anything but contribute to increasing consumer prices and fuelling inflation.
The concessions achieved by Wilson and Callaghan in the renegotiation were 
UK-specific and thus did not affect the CAP as a whole. They included an automatic 
correction mechanism for Britain’s, or any other member state’s, budget contribution 
(but only if a member state’s GDP was 85% or less than the Community average and 
only up to a sum of 250 million Units of Account) and better access for New Zealand 
butter (but not cheese or lamb) until 1980.59 The eight other member states and the 
Commission were not prepared to negotiate Community principles or indeed reopen the 
treaties and the UK government did not insist on this as the results were deemed 
sufficient for Wilson to campaign in favor of remaining in the EC in the referendum 
held on 5 June 1975, resulting in a public vote in favor of staying in the Community. 
This was not the end of British opposition to the CAP, however. The CAP 
continued to frustrate the British government in two main respects: firstly, the policy 
meant that Britain threatened to end up, at the end of the transition period in 1979, as 
the second largest net payer to the Community budget after Germany. Secondly, the 
CAP had increased commodity prices for the British consumer and with inflation 
already rocketing, contributed to the general increase in prices. It was on those two 
domestically driven issues that the British government did battle in Brussels for the 
remainder of the 1970s and early 1980s. In the Council of Agricultural Ministers, 
Britain became the main opponent of the price rises the agricultural ministers adopted 
year on year in the annual price negotiations. In doing so, the British agricultural 
minister staged himself as the lone champion of consumers in Europe. The Labour 
government’s agricultural minister, John Silkin (1976-9), was one of the anti-
marketeers in prime minister Callaghan’s government and a fierce critic of the CAP. He 
regularly condemned the wastefulness of the policy. ‘We must produce food for people 
and not for stores’, became his mantra when referring to the costly food surpluses 
accumulated in the Community storage facilities.60 The minister also advocated CAP 
reform by which he meant a reduction in prices, possibly linked to a Community social 
policy to cushion the effect this would have on less efficient farmers.61 However, such 
ideas were never substantiated in a serious and coherent reform proposal that had the 
potential to satisfy the other member states. When Britain was in the Council presidency 
in the first half of 1977, Silkin, in coalition with the Commission, indeed achieved to 
limit price rises to merely 3.5 percent on average, the lowest since the UK’s accession. 
It was also then that the co-responsibility levy was introduced, a 1.5% levy on milk 
production over a fixed threshold and a first attempt to curb milk production.
Two years on, CAP reform had not progressed further and France, the Benelux 
countries and Germany were set on price increases whereas the UK had advocated a 
reduction in prices or at least a price freeze. Silkin was back in opposition mode. In a 
statement following a Council meeting of agricultural ministers in March 1979 he let off 
steam: 
‘I regard any increase in common prices as an act of cynical and contemptuous 
indifference to the interests not only of the United Kingdom, but also to the 
overwhelming majority of people throughout Europe. Confronted with the 
irrefutable evidence of waste and bad management in the common agricultural 
policy, it has become impossible any longer to ignore it.’62 
This statement was first and foremost for the consumption of the British public 
at home and crucially the Labour party, where hostility to EC membership had become 
rife. However, it underscored two problems: first, unlike their continental counterparts, 
British farm ministers saw themselves more as champions of British consumers than 
British farmers. Secondly, the episode demonstrated the isolation Silkin was prepared to 
accept; he was not forging effective links with his partners in the Council, an ‘epistemic 
community’ in charge of most of the CAP decision-making and sharing common goals 
and interests.63 Rather, in a difficult economic, social and political climate in the UK, 
Silkin wanted to be seen as protecting British consumer interests in Brussels. The CAP 
became a useful tool to stage domestic opposition to ‘Brussels wastefulness’ allegedly 
paid for by the British consumer. Given that the British farm sector was rather small, he 
did not risk opposition by farmers at home as did for example his French, Dutch or 
German counterparts.
In 1979 the transition period came to an end and Britain would have had to pay 
the full membership ‘fee’. It fell to newly elected prime minister Margaret Thatcher to 
raise this issue in Brussels. The British budgetary question dominated the period 
between 1979 and 1984. Commission president Roy Jenkins’ reaction to Thatcher’s 
decision to turn the British budgetary question into a big issue was one of despair given 
the consequences for the Community and Britain’s role in it: ‘she caused a justified but 
limited dispute ... totally to dominate the Community for five years and to run into the 
sand any hopes of, or ambitions for, a British leadership role within the Community.’64 
This can also be said for CAP reform as Thatcher took the decision to pursue a limited 
solution for Britain, a return of budget contributions, rather than push for a Community 
solution to tackle the root of the issue: CAP spending.65 She perhaps realistically judged 
that substantial CAP reform would be a slow and cumbersome undertaking with 
uncertain outcome so that a straightforward budget rebate appeared preferable. The 
Commission, in its proposal in late 1979 to solve the budget problem, tied the budget 
issue together with CAP reform and an increase in the regional and social funds 
intended to benefit the UK.66 Thatcher rejected this idea, not least because she abhorred 
redistributive public policies such as the CAP or indeed a Community regional policy.67 
The other member states also had an interest in keeping the CAP and the issue of the 
British budget contribution separate to keep the CAP intact.68 
Still, both sides used the CAP as a bargaining tool in the budget conflict when it 
suited them; Thatcher for instance when signalling her preparedness of ‘precipitating a 
crisis’ to force a solution and Giscard when pressing the British to agree to a market 
regime for sheepmeat in return for a solution of the budget issue.69 In May 1980 British 
Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington obtained a three-year budget rebate holding the CAP 
to ransom, refusing to participate in the annual negotiations of agricultural prices until 
the budget issue was resolved.70 Another attempt in May 1982 by the British 
government to tie agreement on the British budgetary question to the farm price deal 
failed. When matters came to a head at the meeting of the Council of Agricultural 
Ministers and the British delegation invoked the Luxembourg Compromise (i.e. that 
vital national interests were at stake) on a minor issue in the farm package to 
deliberately delay decision-making (the budget issue was not discussed by farm 
ministers but was a matter for the Foreign Ministers), the Council proceeded to a vote 
and the UK was simply outvoted. This threw a spanner into the British strategy of using 
the CAP to get concessions on the budget contribution.71 It was also a symbolic drawing 
of battle lines: the Community will not let the CAP be held to ransom by the British 
government. Shortly after, on 25 May, a rebate of £500 million was agreed for 1982. In 
1984 the issue was finally resolved at the European Council in Fontainebleau where 
Thatcher won a permanent rebate of 66 per cent from Britain’s budget contribution.72 
The way the Community and hence the CAP as its biggest budgetary item was financed 
had been the underlying cause of the British net contributor status – hence CAP reform 
and British budgetary contribution were linked. However, instead of pushing for a wider 
reform of the CAP, the British government and its partners in the Community decided 
to deal with the ‘British problem’, which was in fact a CAP problem, separately, thus 
keeping the policy intact.
The CAP as a Foreign Policy Issue: The GATT Tokyo Round
Agriculture was first included in GATT talks in the Kennedy Round (1964-7).73 It was 
during this period that the Community constructed the bulk of its agricultural policy, 
including the variable import levy to protect its market from external competitors and 
cheap imports. The EEC at the time was not prepared to negotiate, and possibly weaken, 
its first common policy and the United States were not prepared to press them on the 
issue in order to safeguard European integration.74 Given the for the United States 
disappointing results on agriculture in the Kennedy Round, agriculture was bound to 
resurface as a major issue in the next multilateral trade negotiations. Since the 
conclusion of the Kennedy Round, protectionism had been on the rise, also in the 
United States. To counter this trend, in 1971 the administration of U.S. president 
Richard Nixon (1969-74) took the initiative and proposed a new GATT round.75 
While the EC was reluctant to engage in another round of multilateral trade 
negotiations so soon after the end of the Kennedy Round, it agreed as a gesture of 
goodwill towards the United States. The U.S. government had viewed recent 
developments in the Community with concern. Specifically regarding agriculture, the 
completion of the CAP, the increase in self-sufficiency and agricultural exports and the 
extension of the CAP to the new member states after enlargement, resulting in reduced 
opportunities for U.S. exports to the EC, were an important motive for the Nixon 
administration to bring the EC to the negotiation table.76 In the early 1970s, U.S. 
politicians and political think tanks held an, in retrospect, exaggerated expectation of 
the future development of the Community into a power shaping the world’s economic 
and political developments.77 
For the United States the new GATT round was to be a renewed and vigorous 
attempt to liberalize trade in agriculture and bring it more fully under GATT rules. 
Behind this attitude of the U.S. government was the fundamental difference with which 
it viewed the agricultural sector, namely as an expanding and efficient economic sector 
contributing substantially towards the country’s external trade balance. When the Tokyo 
Round was launched in 1973 the U.S. were in the middle of an economic and financial 
recession. They ‘no longer had the means or the desire to offer concessions to its main 
partners without some sort of quid pro quo’.78 Agriculture contributed $5.6 bn to the 
U.S. trade balance in 1973. The U.S. had a trade surplus with the EC of $2.7bn and 
Japan of $2.2 bn in agricultural products.79 Officials in the Department of Agriculture 
were particularly set on attacking the CAP and opening up the European market further, 
as this corresponded to the wishes of large farmers and agri-business in the United 
States. In August 1973 U.S. secretary of agriculture, Earl L. Butz, reminded the 
secretary of the treasury, George Shultz, of the ‘primary emphasis [that should be given 
in the GATT negotiations] to the reduction of the level of border protection’ as well as 
‘substantial reductions’ in ‘export aids’.80 This targeted primarily the Community’s 
variable-levy system as a barrier to imports, but also export subsidies. The U.S. 
negotiation strategy was to tie industry and agriculture together to ensure that progress 
in agricultural negotiations was substantial and meaningful in trade terms and to achieve 
an increasingly greater market orientation for agriculture.81 In short, they planned an 
onslaught on the CAP. This section outlines why the United States were not more 
successful in their mission to alter the CAP and liberalize trade in agricultural products.
Substance and Procedure 
Attitudes of the various participants towards the GATT negotiations were an indication 
of their attitudes towards, and their attempts to cope with, a globalizing economy.82 The 
launch of the round in Tokyo, Japan, was symbolic of that transformation of the global 
economic order and reshuffle of its key players: Japan, together with the Newly 
Industrialized Countries of East Asia, represented an emerging global industrial regional 
power threatening to upstage the EC and the United States.83 
Against this backdrop, the Community’s stance in the agricultural chapter of the 
negotiations was revealing. The EC regarded the agricultural sector as different from 
other economic sectors due to the volatility of agricultural production, which was 
subject to changing weather conditions and other unpredictable factors. It therefore 
warranted special protection. From the outset, the Community was therefore unlikely to 
agree to alter or even dismantle the CAP in return for concessions in trade for industrial 
products; especially as the Community itself was internally divided over the extent such 
concessions were desirable in the face of an increasingly challenging domestic 
economic situation. In this period of crisis and transformation, maintaining the CAP as a 
fully-fledged Community policy and expressing Community values became 
increasingly important as the turbulent 1970s wore on.  
The Community also had to grapple with member states’ divergent interests and 
stakes in the GATT Tokyo Round. Some, like Germany, were seemingly prepared to 
make concessions in agriculture to secure a substantial deal for trade in industrial 
products; however, in reality even for the Germans, as willing as they were to pursue 
trade liberalization for industrial products, making concessions in agriculture would 
have been resisted by the German farmers’ lobby, the Deutscher Bauernverband. 
Britain, on the other hand, had little interest in preserving the CAP but became more 
protectionist regarding free trade in industrial products as the economic crisis in the UK 
deepened in the course of the 1970s. Finally, the French were opposed to any changes in 
the CAP and were also reluctant to embrace a far-reaching deal on lowering trade 
barriers for industrial goods. ‘All in all, the differing interests of EC members meant 
that gaining concessions for third countries would be difficult.’84 Not least, it was the 
United States that had a trade surplus with the EC in agricultural products and was in 
the position of demandeur. The incentive of the Community to increase its trade deficit 
further and buy even more U.S. farm produce at the expense of its own agricultural 
sector was thus very limited, to say the least. 
The Community’s attitude towards the negotiations also has to be understood 
against the background of the state of the Community and the deteriorating transatlantic 
relations. As mentioned, major new policies such as EMU, did not get off the ground in 
the early 1970s. Work in the Council of Ministers was cumbersome and slow. In 1974, 
the president of the Commission, Ortoli, usually a pragmatic man, deplored that ‘Europe 
itself is in a state of crisis – a crisis of confidence, of will, and of clarity of purpose … it 
shows up just how badly it needs to be united.’85 In this climate of crisis, the CAP still 
embodied the success of European integration - in spite of the disagreements over the 
policy. To this internal crisis of European integration came the uncertainty over 
transatlantic relations, epitomized by Nixon’s national security adviser and secretary of 
state, Henry Kissinger’s misjudged ‘Year of Europe’ speech in 1973.86 The uncertainty 
over the state and future of transatlantic relations led some EC member states, in 
particular France, to ‘rediscover’ the Community and the advantages of acting through 
it. The ability to use the CAP in the GATT negotiations to counter U.S. demands and to 
underscore European unity explain to some extent the Community stance on agriculture 
in the Tokyo Round. 
At the outset of the Tokyo Round, the Commission was keen to position the 
Community as a promoter of the continued liberalization of world trade in industrial 
goods and to play an important role in this drive.87 When it came to agriculture, it was a 
different story and the Commission emphasized the special status of agriculture.88 The 
Council then ring-fenced the CAP completely, insisting that the maintenance of 
agricultural support was non-negotiable for political, economic and social reasons. The 
principles and mechanisms of the CAP were therefore not up for negotiation. The 
Community’s objectives for the GATT round were agreed in June 1973 in the ‘Overall 
Approach’. For agriculture this envisaged an expansion of trade in agricultural products 
to be achieved through a stabilization of world markets through an improved exchange 
of information and a system of joint discipline by exporting nations and commodity 
agreements, but not an elimination of agricultural support systems and an outright 
liberalization of trade in agricultural products.89 The Community’s negotiation position 
was thus set in stone long before the start of the GATT negotiations in Geneva. 
The first strategy the Community employed to counter the free trade aims of the 
American administration was to insist that the agriculture chapter was negotiated 
separately from trade in industrial products. While the Tokyo Declaration of September 
1973 pledged to ‘achieve the expansion and ever-greater liberalization of world trade’, 
it contained the following caveat for agriculture: to include, ‘as regards agriculture, an 
approach to negotiations which, while in line with the general objectives of the 
negotiations, should take account of the special characteristics and problems in this 
sector’.90 For the Community this justified their approach of separating negotiations in 
agriculture from those in other sectors of the economy.91 The demand caused upheaval 
in Washington and some predicted correctly that ‘the rules of the game determine its 
outcome. Procedure is substance.’92 This was echoed in the Ministry of Agriculture 
where Butz warned that this ‘provides a convenient way to avoid negotiating on these 
products without jeopardizing the rest of the negotiations, but with great potential loss 
to the U.S.’.93 The Americans had aimed for a different negotiating structure in which 
agriculture was negotiated on the same terms as industrial products, even linking 
progress in one area to progress in the other. However, the EC rigorously opposed this 
approach and by confining agriculture in one negotiation group, it became easier to 
oversee and control any concessions that were made on agriculture.94
The Community prevailed in the end even though the United States continued to 
contest the issue until the coming into office of president Jimmy Carter in early 1977. 
For instance, the Trade Act of December 1974 explicitly stated that: ‘to the maximum 
extent feasible, the harmonization, reduction, or elimination of agricultural trade 
barriers and distortions shall be undertaken in conjunction with harmonization, 
reduction, or elimination of industrial trade barriers and distortions.’95 The US had no 
intention of giving in to the Community demand so easily as its negotiators would have 
had a hard time getting any deal accepted by Congress. The Community, on the other 
hand, had every interest to stick to its original position which had been adopted by all 
member states. The Commission feared that any reopening of this issue in the Council 
‘will almost certainly lead to the French adopting an even tougher attitude […] and thus 
reduce our room for manoeuvre to a minimum’.96 The question was who the 
Community would rather face, the Americans or the French? The Community opted for 
the former option to maintain the unity of the EC position.97 
World Food Crisis
Due to a number of calamitous events in world commodity markets, prices for grains, 
one of the most traded commodities, surged by between 250 and 350 percent from mid-
1972 to late 1974.98 The hike in grain prices had an inflationary effect on world 
commodity price levels generally. The world food crisis, as it became known, had 
disastrous consequences for poor countries in particular, leading to famines, but also 
contributed to inflation and difficulties in agricultural markets in Western countries. The 
fact that the beginning of the GATT round coincided with the world food crisis was a 
fortunate coincidence for the Community. Record grain harvests in the EC in the early 
1970s meant that during the world food crisis the EC managed to supply consumers at 
comparatively low prices and costs for the CAP also temporarily decreased.99 The 
Commission optimistically interpreted the global food shortages as structural rather than 
seasonal or exceptional.100 Against this backdrop, the aim of stabilizing markets by 
establishing a system of surveillance and information on market situations, international 
product agreements and common rules of ‘concerted discipline’ appealed much more 
than a liberalization of trade in agricultural products.101 Under the impression of the 
world food crisis, the U.S. administration also placed more emphasis on the importance 
of market stability as a foreign policy aim. This eventually facilitated their acceptance 
of the EC’s proposal to conclude commodity agreements. In an internal document in 
1973 the U.S. representative to the EC had already suggested that commodity 
agreements would be a way to avoid a possible stalemate in the negotiations early on: 
‘The only prospect of getting ahead in agriculture is for us to indicate a willingness to 
consider the European approach and find out what the practical possibilities are.’102 In 
April 1977 the new U.S. administration under president Carter decided to go along with 
the Community’s proposal and agree to a product-by-product negotiation procedure 
instead of a multilateral trade deal for agricultural products.103 
Negotiations and Results
U.S. negotiators, in particular secretary of agriculture, Clayton Yeutter, and special 
representative for trade negotiations, Frederick Dent, pursued a hard line in Geneva 
where the GATT negotiations took place. However, while the tone at the negotiation 
table might have been deliberately harsh to extract some concessions from the 
Europeans, in Washington there was still understanding for the EC’s position and the 
centrality the CAP occupied in the Community. In reality, the expectations of the 
Americans to reach a substantial deal on agriculture cannot therefore have been very 
high. It was understood that the CAP was a sensitive issue, going as far as to admit that 
‘a frontal attack on the CAP would be folly’.104 Even during the presidency of Gerald 
Ford (1974-6), allegedly more hardline on trade liberalization in agriculture, Dent 
assessed the Community’s difficulties with acuity and suggested that the Trade round 
was an opportunity to make sure the EC remained engaged in world affairs rather than 
retreating in on its own difficulties.105 The political and overall economic importance of 
the GATT Round as a means to prevent the EC from giving in to the temptations of 
protectionism were thus understood and would eventually lead to a compromise 
whereby the United States accepted the commodity arrangements the EC had pushed, 
provided sufficient progress was made in the areas of tariff reduction and reduction of 
non-tariff barriers in trade for industrial products. Before this happened however, the 
U.S. negotiators in Geneva, in concert with other nations interested in agricultural trade 
such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand were giving the Commission’s negotiators 
a hard time, not least to placate their domestic audiences.106 Crucially, there was a real 
threat that the U.S. Congress would not vote in favor of the negotiation result, if it did 
not contain enough trade advantages for both U.S. industrial and agricultural exports. 
The negotiations in the agriculture group ground to a halt in the summer of 1976, the 
year of the presidential elections in the United States. 
When the Democrat Carter became president in early 1977, he was determined 
to bring the Tokyo Round to a successful conclusion. In order to achieve this, the U.S. 
administration decided to prioritize industry over agriculture and largely accept the 
EC’s way of dealing with agriculture.107 Carter announced this change of priority at the 
economic summit in London in May 1977. Arguably, the compromise on agriculture 
was less of a sacrifice for the United States, given that U.S. agriculture was already 
running a vast trade surplus with the EC, whereas other sectors of the economy were 
running a trade deficit and needed a boost through a GATT agreement on lowering 
tariffs and other barriers to trade. 108 
In July 1977 the agriculture negotiation group in Geneva finally agreed on the 
negotiation modalities for agriculture. Carters’ new special trade representative, Robert 
Strauss, had agreed that agriculture could be negotiated separately from industry ‘in 
parallel’ and that the Americans would not demand changes to the CAP in return for 
concessions in individual agricultural products.109 This resulted in the ‘item by item 
approach’ and vexed exporting nations such as Australia who had been looking for a 
multilateral solution.110 Instead, the U.S. requested specific concessions on exports of its 
agricultural products to the Community. The EC in return asked for better access for its 
dairy products. On 22 December 1978 the Commission and the United States published 
a joint declaration regarding the multilateral trade negotiations, indicating that the main 
elements of a deal were on the table as far as they were concerned. Regarding 
agriculture, they envisaged four international commodity agreements (beef, dairy and 
two for cereals), agreements on non-tariff measures as well as bilateral concessions for 
certain agricultural products.111 
The Tokyo Round ended on 19 April 1979 and resulted in tariff cuts of 35 
percent on average for industrial products.112 In agriculture, the Community largely 
achieved the objectives it had set out in the ‘Overall Approach’. The final agreement 
contained two new international agreements, one on beef and one on dairy products. 
The US obtained concessions for its farm exports to the EC amounting to about $168 
million while the EC obtained concessions valued at $106 million.113 But none of the 
results put the CAP into question. 
The Tokyo Round had been the first serious attempt to bring agriculture under 
more general GATT rules. This aim was not achieved, largely due to the resistance of 
the EC and other countries with protectionist agricultural policies such as Japan. The 
Community considered the fact that agriculture was granted a special status and was 
negotiated separately from industrial products as a success and a confirmation of the 
CAP system and the special status of agriculture in the economy and the world trading 
system. Neomercantilism in the shape of stabilizing and sharing markets survived in the 
agricultural sector, not least due to the depressing economic situation under which the 
negotiations were conducted and concluded.  What does this ‘victory’ mean? During the 
1970s, the economic and monetary difficulties and the pressures on the political 
institutions of the Community and the member states meant that the EC negotiated in 
the Tokyo Round in an inward-looking manner. The fact that the member states were 
able to agree on common positions was, in this phase, already a success. The 
Community had to accommodate a wide range of member state interests, drawn even 
more apart by the global challenges member states were facing and responding to. The 
United Kingdom, France and Italy had been reluctant to embrace free trade, while the 
German and Dutch governments consistently argued in favor of it.114 It is likely that a 
hardline position on agriculture was the compromise needed in return for the French 
government to agree to more tariff reductions for industrial products.115 
The Community’s strategy had been to press ahead with defining very narrow 
negotiation aims for agriculture early on in the negotiations and present its negotiation 
partners with a fait accompli. The world food crisis helped firm up the Community’s 
negotiation stance in 1974/5. However, when the crisis subsided, the Community did 
not reassess its aims for the agriculture chapter in the GATT. With an already difficult 
domestic political situation to deal with, there was no appetite among member states to 
risk division in its ranks and open up a new front of protests by farmers. Such 
constraints worked in the Community’s favor. The complexity of Community decision-
making means that the Community was able to pursue a strategy of ‘tied hands’, unable 
to make concessions. Ultimately it can be said that at the outset of the 1970s the United 
States had held an exaggerated idea of the EC as a global political and trading power 
and they subsequently had to scale down their expectations of how far the EC would 
share international responsibilities and become a partner in trade liberalization.
Conclusion
The CAP in the 1970s and early 1980s occupied what could be called a ‘reluctant 
centrality’ in the Community due to its status as a fully developed common policy that 
included aspects of social, economic and foreign policy. In an era shaken by political 
uncertainty and global economic and monetary turbulences, the CAP as one of the few 
fully developed common policies of the Community became a symbol for the unity of 
the EC. As a response to the Community’s ‘crisis of identity and purpose’ in the 1970s, 
the CAP and its preservation became essential. Giving up the CAP or starting a debate 
on the future of the policy would have led to a situation in which the survival of the 
Community might have been at stake. France, in particular, might have walked away 
from the Community or at least presented this as a credible option in case the CAP was 
threatened. The emergence of summitry in the 1970s was another new factor in 
international relations, which threatened to divide rather than unite the Community. 
Small member states were not invited to the meetings of the G7 whereas the large 
member states met with the United States, Canada and Japan to strike deals of their 
own, not necessarily in the name of the Community. The strong presence of the 
Community in the GATT therefore preserved one element of the Community’s unity as 
a global actor. This, as well as the entrenched policy-making rituals and an epistemic 
community in the Council of Ministers and the Commission which defended the 
centrality and importance of the policy ensured the CAP remained ‘path dependent’ 
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Rather than presenting a shock to the Community, the British government 
adapted gradually and reluctantly to the CAP and the way of doing business in the 
Community. The article has argued that UK accession did not result in CAP reform as 
the British government underestimated the centrality of the CAP for the Community. 
British politicians were also unable and often unwilling to ‘play the Brussels game’ and 
forge coalitions with their continental counterparts. They also lacked reliable allies: 
whilst the German government under chancellor Schmidt should have been a natural 
ally for CAP reform, Schmidt time and again failed to confront his agricultural minister 
and the German farm lobby. Furthermore, the problems Britain had with the CAP were 
singled out and treated as particularly ‘British’ problems to maintain the integrity of the 
CAP, such as the renegotiation of the terms of entry in 1974/5 or the British budget 
contribution. It was only when the member states agreed to new substantial initiatives 
such as the Single Market Programme in the mid-1980s that the CAP somewhat lost its 
centrality in European integration. The new Community actor, the European Council, 
while not exactly a firebrand of reform, was forced to consider the CAP and its 
problems in the wider context of Community policies and priorities. Together with a 
more reform-oriented Commission, these developments facilitated incremental reform 
and a challenge to the CAP’s centrality, rather than a single ‘shock’ event. 
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